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Through the use of an EGARCH model and a fixed effects panel regression, the 
reaction of emerging market stock and bond volatility to sovereign credit ratings changes is 
examined. The daily data covers the period of 1990 to 2016 and emerging market crises, such 
as the 1994 Mexican peso crisis, 1997 Asian financial crises and the global 2008 financial 
crises. The estimations provide evidence of an asymmetric effect of rating changes on stock 
volatilities, whereby downgrades have a significant impact, while upgrades have no such 
effect. For bonds the effect is ambiguous with both upgrades and downgrades having an 
effect. Downgrades are found to increase both stock and bond market volatility. On aggregate, 
contagion effects amongst stocks are found for emerging markets, as well as for the 
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background 
 
Credit ratings, as evidenced in the past decade, are coming into the spotlight as 
emerging markets are assigned a sovereign credit rating for the first time. As such, investors 
are looking to emerging markets as new investment horizons (Kraussl, 2005). The reason for 
this is that credit ratings give an indication of the willingness of sovereign states to meet their 
debt obligations. This is done by assessing the risk inherent in emerging markets, thus 
allowing investors to make international investment decisions (Amstad & Packer, 2015). In 
making these decisions volatility in emerging markets is thus pivotal to the investor’s 
decision making process. This study assesses the volatility of stock and bond markets of 
emerging markets and how they are affected by ratings upgrades and downgrades. It also 
looks at the asymmetries inherent in negative and positive return shocks on future returns. 
The study thus continues to delve into the contagion effects of ratings changes and assesses if 
emerging markets display interdependence in their second moments.  
After the 2008–2009 financial crisis, the importance of having accurate credit ratings 
became instrumental to navigating the financial minefield of sub-prime debt. Inaccurate 
ratings have been argued to have exacerbated the financial crisis, and have been found to 
have a greater impact on bond and stock markets, post 2008 (Kang & Min, 2016). Volatility 
has had a marked increase in several European Union (E.U.) countries after the financial 
crises (Afonso, Gomes, & Taamouti, 2014). These events can be associated with increased 
indebtedness of European states, resulting in exacerbated financial instability and degraded 
investor confidence, both ending with funding constraints to these nations. Despite these 
caveats, the consistent increase in debt issuers across the world has increased the demand for 
ratings. As such, rating agencies control the gateway to capital markets for bond issuers and 
debt market participants (Williams, Alsakka, & Gwilym, 2013).  
 Since emerging markets are among the largest high-yield borrowers in the world, 
ratings agencies are of vital importance to them (Ismailescu & Kazemi, 2010). As such, some 
of the largest emerging markets - BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) have 
decided, amongst themselves, to set up a ratings agency, catering specifically to emerging 
markets, with future intentions of rivalling the three main ratings agencies - Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s and Fitch (Beniwal, 2016). This agency will seek to eliminate the 
moral hazard problem inherent in American rating agencies’ revenue model.  Companies are 
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currently required to pay the very same ratings agencies that assign them with a rating, 
therefore imposing an ethical dilemma. FitzGerald (2009) points out that even if sovereign 
states do not intend issuing cross border debt in the immediate future, they still seek out 
credit ratings. This is due to benefits such as fostering Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
promotion of more vibrant local capital markets, and increased public sector financial 
transparency. 
The credit ratings literature is extensive, with the majority of papers cited examining 
macroeconomic drivers of ratings changes (Cantor & Pacher, 1996; Afonso, 2003; Kraussl, 
2005; Erdem & Varli, 2010; Montes, Oliveira, & Mendonça, 2016; Borenszstein, Valenzuela, 
& Cowan, 2006; Williams et al, 2013; Hammoudeh, Sari, Uzunkaya & Liu, 2012). Other 
cited literature has delved into the transmission of ratings changes, examining whether they 
lead to an overall positive or negative effect on markets. Authors such as Amstad and Packer 
(2015) and Williams et al. (2013) have argued the importance of credit ratings for investors in 
making asset allocation decisions. Contrastingly, Li, Joen, Cho and Chiang (2007), Mora 
(2006) and Kraussl (2005) argue that ratings agencies are slow to respond to economic 
activity, which exacerbates and prolongs financial market upswings and downswings 
The purpose of this study is to examine emerging market stock and bond volatility for 
the period of 1990 to 2016, and to dissect the different facets of credit rating changes’ effects 
on stock and bond market volatility for these markets. Over the period of 1990 to 2016, this 
study covers emerging market crises, such as the 1994 Mexican peso crises, 1997 Asian 
financial crises and the global 2008 financial crisis. This study complements previous studies 
covering the effects of ratings upgrades and downgrades on stock and bond market volatility. 
These include studies such as Christiansen’s (2007) study of contagion and volatility spill-
overs amongst the United States (U.S.) and European bond markets; Engle, Gallo, and 
Velucci’s (2012) study of volatility spill-overs in East Asian financial markets, as well as 
Afonso et al.‘s (2014) study of volatility spill-overs resulting from credit rating changes 
amongst EU nations.   
Primarily, it serves to provide a unified framework that combines sovereign rating and 
contagion literature, creating a link between rating changes and stock and bond second 
moments. Other papers have not linked these concepts for emerging markets as a whole. It 
also eliminates the bias that is typically associated with only making use of the three 
mainstream rating agencies, by making use of a total of nine ratings agencies.  This provides 
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a unique emerging market view of the effect of ratings changes on bond and stock second 
moments. 
The importance of this study is three-fold in understanding the impact of sovereign 
rating changes on financial markets. Firstly, it adds to the theoretical understanding of the 
price discovery process by directly evaluating the variables that are pertinent to financial 
markets in the pricing of assets - being returns and volatility. 
Secondly, it provides valuable information for international investors and managers of 
international portfolios. Managers and investors are faced with a wave of information relating 
to the risk of investing in foreign nations, often turning to sovereign credit ratings as a 
country risk indicator. Engle et al. (2012) and Gallo and Velucchi (2012) note that when 
investors are faced with increased volatility in their country’s stock markets, they naturally 
reduce their positions due to the extra risk. French and Porterba (1991) analyse the benefits to 
investors of international diversification amongst advanced economies’ stock markets. They 
found advanced economies’ stock markets are highly correlated, and thus cross border risk 
reduction was less effective relative to emerging markets. 
Thirdly, a comprehensive understanding of the effects of ratings changes on financial 
markets will improve financial market policy. If ratings do in fact have an effect on stocks 
and bonds, then they can exacerbate and prolong financial crises. Policies should therefore 
address this possibility, additionally factoring in potential contagion from other financial 
market downgrades and upgrades. Furthermore, financial and economic crises tend to be 
regional in nature, as was evident during the recent recessions, such as the European debt 
crisis, the Asian financial crisis and the Argentine debt crisis (Kaminsky et al, 2002). Thus, 
an understanding of spill-overs across emerging markets and within regions can be used not 
only reactively but proactively too, possibly smoothing out financial crises or business cycle 
upswings and/or downswings.   
In hypothesis, a nation that is risky is expected to be more volatile. The lower a nation’s 
credit rating, the more volatility will be inherent in the sovereign nation’s bond and stock 
markets. Heinke (2006) finds evidence of lower grade bonds being more volatile, while 
Jaramillo and Tejada (2011) find evidence of lower grade bonds having larger spreads. It is 
also hypothesised that negative rating changes will only have an effect on the second 
moments of bonds and stocks, while positive ratings changes will have no effect. This is 
expected as previous research finds that positive rating changes have negligible effects on 
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returns, while negative ratings changes have statistically significant effects on stock and bond 
returns. These significant effects can be expected to perpetuate into the second moments of 
the stocks and bonds. With regard to contagion, it is hypothesised that nations that are 
geographically close can be expected to have significant volatility spill-over effects on one 
another. 
1.2 Research aim and objectives 
 
This study seeks to provide a more detailed understanding of the effects of credit ratings 
on emerging markets. Moreover, this research assists investors in their international 
investment decisions. Furthermore, it assists policy makers in protecting financial markets 
from prolonged financial crises. This is done through the following three main aims.  
(i) To analyse whether countries with higher credit ratings exhibit less volatility than 
lower rated countries 
(ii) To examine the differences in the effects of positive versus negative 
announcements on volatility for emerging markets; and 
(iii) To assess whether volatility in non-event countries react to rating changes of other 
event countries (contagion), and whether there are asymmetries in the 
transmission of these spill-over effects. 
1.3 Research structure  
 
The order followed by this research is as followed:  
Firstly, it focuses on a literature review that covers important studies vital to the 
understanding of credit ratings and their effects. It covers the drivers of credit ratings, 
transmission mechanisms, ratings changes effects on bonds and stocks, the bias towards 
downgrades, as well as an analysis of bond and stock volatility and contagion effects.  
Secondly, the methodology is then detailed, and the EGARCH and the fixed effects panel 
approach are explained at length.  
Thirdly, a number of findings are reported that add fresh insights to the literature. In 
addition, the volatility of stocks is shown to increase as the credit rating of emerging markets 
deteriorates, but there is no clear visual pattern present for bonds.  
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Fourthly, downgrades are shown to have a statistically significant effect on the second 
moments of stock and bond returns while upgrades are shown to have a negligible effect.  
Lastly, on aggregate, contagion effects amongst stocks are found for emerging markets, 
as well as for the continents of Asia and Europe. No such evidence is found for bonds.  
2 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Drivers of ratings changes 
 
It is widely known that rating agencies do not explicitly reveal their methods. Due to 
this opaque approach, the drivers of rating changes are not strictly known. An early paper by 
Cantor and Pacher (1996) identified what they thought were the seven most important 
macroeconomic variables to drive ratings changes.  The study was comprehensive, covering 
49 developed and developing nations, using a cross sectional regression. They found that for 
a $1000 rise in per capita income, ratings for S&P increases by 1.5 grades on average. In 
addition, Cantor and Pacher (1996) also found that developing nations tend to be three grades 
lower on average, and having a history of default leads to a rating two grades lower than a 
nation that maintained its debt obligations. 
These results were further reinforced by Afonso (2003), where he identified the six 
main determinants of credit ratings changes. These include Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per capita, external debt-to-exports ratio, level of economic development, default history, the 
real growth rate, and the inflation rate. Similar drivers were evidenced by Erdem and Varli 
(2014). Using quarterly data from 2002 to 2011 for emerging markets, their results indicate 
that the variables of Budget Balance/GDP, GDP per capita, Governance Indicators and 
Reserves/GDP have a significant effect on credit ratings independent of rating scale.  In their 
ordered response analysis, all significant variables in the linear models plus External 
Debt/Export variable appear to be significant.  
Afonso’s (2003) study examined 81 developing and developed nations, finding that 
GDP per capita emerges as virtually the sole relevant economic driver for developed 
countries, while external debt is important for developing countries. 
Prior to the 1990’s, few papers focused exclusively on rating changes in emerging 
markets, but that is fast changing. From 1993 to 2000, Moody’s saw a more than five-fold 
growth in the number of emerging market sovereigns that received a credit rating on their 
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long term foreign currency debt issues. The figures indicate that in 1993, Moody’s assessed 
only 12 emerging market economies. However, the number of rated governments accelerated 
rapidly in the mid-1990s, as several governments, particularly transition economies and 
countries in the Middle East, sought access to international bond markets (Kraussl, 2005). 
In response to this growth in rated emerging markets, Montes et al. (2016) conducted 
a panel data approach for the 1994 to 2013 period. They found that GDP Growth, Per Capita 
GDP, Inflation, foreign reserves, government budget balance and external debt were all 
significant macroeconomic drivers of rating changes. They also found that the adoption of 
inflation targeting, financial openness, democracy, law and order, and less corruption are 
important drivers to improve the sovereign rating of a developing nation. The study also 
sought to highlight the importance of the adoption of inflation targeting, finding that inflation 
targeting nations generally had better ratings than non-inflation targeting countries. 
 Williams et al. (2013) adds to the dynamic of Montes et al.’s (2016) paper. In their 
findings, the higher the score of economic freedom, financial freedom, government spending, 
investment freedom and business freedom, the less likely banks are to be upgraded, following 
recent sovereign rating upgrades. The results show that the lower the economic, financial, 
investment and business freedom of a nation, the more likely locally owned banks are to be 
upgraded following a sovereign upgrade and vice versa for downgrades. A study that focused 
on separate economic, political and financial risk ratings of each nation gives clarity as to the 
long run effects of risk changes on stock exchanges. Using the BRICS nations over the 1992 
to 2011 period, Hammoudeh et al. (2012) found that debt servicing, international liquidity, 
Balance of Payments (BOP) as a percentage of GDP and exchange rate stability emerge as 
important drivers of risk to stock markets. 
As can be seen from the majority of studies, there is an overlap of important macroeconomic 
drivers of rating changes. GDP, however, emerges as the most prominent and significant 
driver. 
2.2 Transmission of ratings changes 
 
GDP depends on private consumption, government spending, exports, imports and 
finally, private investment (Blanchard, 2011). Ratings changes affect sovereign nations 
through transmission mechanisms, one being private investment or the investment channel 
(Chen, Chen, Chang, & Yang, 2013). Chen et al. (2013) explain that credit ratings affect 
physical investment through the cost of capital to firms. Uncertainty in financial markets can 
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cause a flight–to-quality effect where investors prefer to move their funds to safer assets. The 
basic premise is that if a country suffers from a rating downgrade it becomes riskier, thus 
pushing interest rates up. Investment projects that were previously viable with a positive net 
present value (NPV) become unviable with negative NPV’s. As a result, investment 
decreases, reducing GDP.  
Chen et al. (2013) confirmed that following a ratings upgrade/downgrade, there is a 
significant increase/decrease in private investment growth in a nation. This was found by 
making use of a dynamic panel data approach for 48 nations, however, the effects were found 
to be temporary - lasting for one year after the downgrade/upgrade. On average, private 
investment growth was shown to be 3.2%, but after the downgrade, it dropped to -11.5% and 
-10.1% in the subsequent years. The hypothesised reason for the temporary effects: when a 
downgrade occurs, it increases a country’s risk premium. Thus, investors stall investment 
until new information arises, in turn, causing the initial drop in private investment, and then 
returning to normal.  
By examining data for the cost of capital, Chen et al. (2013) solidified this empirical 
link between ratings changes and their effect on private investment. This was done by 
proving an empirical negative correlation between the cost of capital and private investment.  
A significant effect of ratings changes on the cost of capital and hence, on private investment, 
was found.  
In addition to transmission mechanisms such as the investment channel, ratings 
agencies’ policies have transmission effects. A policy shared by most ratings agencies is that 
the rating of a private company cannot be higher than that of the sovereign nation in which it 
resides. As Moody’s (2015) explain, credit ceilings show the maximum rating for a debt 
issuer where that issuer originated its cash flows in a particular country. This policy is termed 
the ‘Sovereign Credit Ceiling’ and has detrimental effects for private companies due to rating 
changes. In essence, if the sovereign nation is downgraded, then so are private companies and 
with a lower rating, they will have less access to financing.  
The motivation for the rule was that government holds the first claim on any available 
foreign exchange reserves, and thus controls the domestic company’s ability to get hold of 
foreign currency during a crisis (Kraussl, 2005). In order to investigate the effects of 
‘Sovereign Credit Ceilings’ Almedia, Cunha, Ferreira, and Restrepo (2016) separated firms 
into bounded firms and non-bounded firms. Bonded firms had a company rating equal to the 
sovereign rating, while non-bounded firms had a rating below the sovereign rating.  They 
found that bounded firms were significantly more likely to be downgraded after a sovereign 
rating downgrade than a non-bounded firm. The consequences of this were found to be that 
bounded firms cut investment, reduce net debt issuance and increase equity issuance more 
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than non-bounded firms, following a downgrade. This results in a significantly greater 
increase in their cost of capital compared to non-bounded firms (Almedia et al., 2016). 
When taking a more specific look at the effects of the sovereign ceiling rule, the 
banking sector makes for a prime example. Williams et al. (2013) found that a bank is 63.2% 
more likely to be upgraded by one notch on the ratings scale if the sovereign nation had a one 
notch upgrade. If the sovereign nation is upgraded by two notches then the probability of the 
bank being upgraded is even higher, sitting at 87.1%. With regards to downgrades, a bank is 
26% more likely to be downgraded by one notch on the ratings scale following a one notch 
sovereign downgrade, and 62.2% more likely to be downgraded by two or more notches 
following a two or more notch sovereign downgrade (Williams et al., 2012).   
The sovereign credit ceiling as a policy has however, slowly started to fade away. In 
April 1997, S&P relaxed its sovereign ceiling rule for three dollarised economies - Argentina, 
Panama, and Uruguay which began a cascading effect of revoking the policy across ratings 
agencies (Almedia et al., 2016). Even though the policy has largely been revoked, its effect 
has remained. Borensztein et al. (2013) conclude that the ‘Sovereign credit ceiling’ policy 
tends to remain in effect, particularly in countries where capital account restrictions are still 
in place, but is not statistically significant for countries that are financially liberalised. This is 
however, a critical issue for well managed and reliable private firms in emerging markets, as 
sovereign ratings in emerging markets tend to be on average lower than that of developed 
nations. 
Besides the sovereign ceiling rule, a grade of a bond can determine whether it is 
allowed to be traded as per regulation. Kraussl (2005) notes that for institutional investors, 
this is critical as they operate within the bounds of their trading parameters. For example, an 
investor that manages an investment grade bond portfolio can be restricted from holding 
speculative grade bonds. This transmits directly to the demand for bonds, if a sovereign rating 
upgrade occurs from speculative to investment grade, it can open a nation up to portfolio 
diversification from foreign investors, thus increasing the demand for bonds, and stabilising 
bond demand simultaneously. The opposite is true where a nation is downgraded, it can 
reduce and destabilise the demand for bonds.  
As to the effectiveness of the transmission mechanisms, this depends on the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH). The EMH predicts that if ratings agencies use publicly traded 
information to create sovereign ratings, then stock and bond prices will not adjust in reaction 
to rating announcements. This is because the market would have already taken the rating 
changes into account and adjusted accordingly (Brooks et al., 2002). Ding, Clive, Granger, 
and Engle (1993) analysed daily returns on the S&P 500 stock index. In doing so, they found 
that most stock series have a positive first order correlation, suggesting that stocks do, in fact, 
have a small amount of memory incorporated into their pricing. Even though this effect is 
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found to be short lived, it provides evidence against the strict form of the EMH. This suggests 
that stocks themselves are not completely efficient, yet alone accounting for changes in 
sovereign ratings. As such, ratings changes, if unanticipated, can have a significant effect on 
stocks.  
The situation is however more complicated than at first would seem. As pointed out 
by Micu, Remolona, and Wooldridge (2006), relevant information to assess the 
creditworthiness of sovereigns are available daily. Thus, for sovereign ratings to be relevant 
they also need to be high frequency, but this needs to be balanced with a low volatility of 
credit ratings. This is because a low volatility of ratings instils investor confidence in ratings. 
So, in a complicated turn, rating agencies cannot release ratings too frequently in order to 
remain stable, but not being frequent means that they may not be relevant over and above 
publicly available information. As such, the EMH would hold. To address this issue, rating 
agencies have announcements, outlooks and rating changes, which all serve the same purpose, 
but provide a higher frequency, yet lower volatility.   
In order to analyse the different rating events effects, a study by Micu et al. (2006) 
running from 2001 to 2005, made use of daily data on Credit Defaults Swaps (CDS) spreads. 
An event study was then conducted to see the timing of the effects of ratings announcements 
on these spreads. The results indicate that all types of ratings announcements have a 
statistically significant effect on CDS’s spreads. The interesting result is that rating 
announcements are to a large extent anticipated, as some adjustment occurs before the rating 
announcement. It is however concluded that all rating announcements do include relevant 
pricing information, as they are not fully anticipated by the market. Thus, rating changes are 
found to add value and the EMH is found to hold, but only in the semi-strong form.  
These results were confirmed to a large degree in a similar study by Ismailescu and 
Kazemi (2010), who used standard event study methodology to show the effects of credit 
ratings on CDS. Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) find upgrades tend to contain new 
information, as 87% of positive rating announcements resulted in a decline in the event 
country CDS spread on day one. However, negative announcements were found to convey 
little new information. The overall result rejects the strict version of the EMH, in that CDS 
markets are efficient. These results are consistent with Micu et al. (2006) and shed light on 
the information content of ratings announcements for financial markets.  
If, however, the EMH holds, then ratings can be highly detrimental to economies, 
possibly exacerbating economic upswings and downswings. Li et al. (2007) hypothesised that 
rating changes might lead to pro-cyclical behaviour, which is devastating during a financial 
crisis. They suggest that ratings agencies will only adjust their ratings after the crisis has 
occurred, leading to unnecessary capital outflows after the crisis has begun. They tested the 
hypothesis with the use of a panel regression on five countries hit hardest during the 1997 
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Asian crisis (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Korea). After testing, they found 
no strong and consistent evidence of pro-cyclical behaviour by credit ratings agencies (Li et 
al., 2007). 
Their findings are in line with Mora (2006), whose results find it questionable that 
ratings exacerbate the boom-bust cycle. Mora’s (2006) study focused on East Asian nations 
and found that ratings are, if anything, sticky rather than exhibiting pro-cyclical behaviour.  
They then forecasted ratings, finding that actual ratings exceeded predicted ratings before a 
crisis, yet were accurate during a crisis period. This suggests that ratings were excessively 
high before a crisis and rating agencies were reacting to the bad news of a crisis thus pointing 
to pro-cyclical behaviour, but Mora (2006) also found ratings to react strongly to non-
macroeconomic variables, suggesting that ratings reacted to news, rather than 
macroeconomic fundamentals during a crisis. As such, it was concluded that they are unlikely 
to exacerbate the business cycle.   
In contrast, Kraussl (2005) finds evidence of pro-cyclicality in credit rating agencies. 
This was found by constructing an index which gave an indication of speculative market 
pressure (SMP Index), comprising changes in exchange rates, interest rates and the stock 
market. A standard event study methodology was employed, making use of Moody and S&P 
ratings. The period under observation was between January 1997 and December 2000, 
incorporating the dot com bubble. The findings show that changes in credit ratings had 
significant effects on the SMP index. Positive events lead to a decrease in the SMP index, 
whereas negative events lead to an increase. Empirically, rating announcements lagged 
changes in the SMP index, providing evidence that credit rating agencies react to market 
movements. Thus, they are concluded to, in fact, behave in a pro-cyclical manner and 
exacerbate the boom-bust cycle. 
From the above, it can be shown that there are several ways that credit rating effects 
are transmitted to the domestic economy, such as effect on private investment and the 
sovereign ceiling channel. Also, the extent of the transmission depends on the efficiency of 
the financial markets. However, little has been discussed as to how credit rating effects are 
transmitted from a foreign nation to a domestic nation – typically referred to as cross border 
contagion and spill-over effects.  
Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) point to the common lender and international trade as 
possible transmission mechanisms for international contagion effects from credit ratings. The 
common lender approach suggests that most sovereigns have at least one, or even a few 
sovereigns in common from which they lend. As such, a rating change in the common lender 
sovereign will send shock waves through to all the nations to which it provides credit.  
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Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), in their analysis of 30 nations, show the U.S. and 
Japan emerge as major lenders in their sample. They find that the majority of nations turn to 
the U.S. for capital while Asian nations turn to Japan for financing. This provides a strong 
basis for the theory, and they hypothesised that a positive credit rating event coming from a 
country that uses the same lender will lower the CDS premium of the non-event country. The 
second transmission (international trade flows) suggests that if a sovereign receives a better 
rating, it is more likely to engage in international trade, as it can service its payments for 
imports better and meet the demands of exports.   
Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) find that the common creditor is a statistically 
significant transmission mechanism for the effects of credit ratings across nations. It is also 
observed that CDS premiums of the non-event nation decline heavily in response to an 
upgrade in a country that shares the same lender. Trade flows are not found to be a significant 
transmission mechanism, however trade flows from the U.S. are shown to be a significant 
determinant of CDS premiums. 
2.3 Ratings and crisis 
 
Ratings agencies’ most severe impact can come during times of financial crisis. An 
example of these impacts is the knock-on effects that occurred during the Asian crisis of 1997. 
As Reisen (1999) points out, ratings agencies largely failed to predict the Asian crisis. There 
was a small amount of concern by rating agencies as two Asian nations were downgraded by 
one notch ahead of the crisis. When the crisis hit however, sovereign ratings of Asian 
borrowers plummeted to junk status. The knock-on effect of this was that commercial banks 
could no longer issue letters of credit for local importers and exporters, foreign creditors 
called in their loans and institutional investors offloaded Asian assets. This is because most of 
the adjustment in ratings only occurred after the crisis erupted. It is argued that credit ratings 
largely reinforced the crisis instead of forecasting it as ratings are intended to do.  
Bhatia (2002) argues that the reason rating agencies missed the looming crisis was 
because of their focus on macroeconomic fundamentals. Many Asian nations had sound 
macroeconomic fundamentals but little emphasis was placed on the Asian nations’ 
international liquidity considerations and private sector weakness. These are the variables that 
eventually led to the crisis. In support, Li et al. (2007) note that even when it was public 
knowledge that an outbreak had occurred in July 1997, there was no warning signal issued by 
the rating agencies. In addition, rating agencies failed to predict the 1994-1995 Mexican 
crisis. The evidence, Larrain, Reisen, and Von Maltzan (1997) say, lies in the fact that the 
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peso tumbled in value at December 20
th
 1994, but at December 22
nd
 S&P still had Mexico’s 
rating at one notch below investment grade with a positive outlook.  
Reinhart (2002) finds that for emerging markets, the probability of having a currency 
crisis within 24 months of defaulting is about 84%. The probability of having a default within 
24 months of a currency crisis is lower: about 58% for the entire sample, and 66% for 
emerging market economies. These results provide evidence of the link between currency 
crisis and defaults for emerging economies. Reinhart’s (2002) findings suggest upgrades 
reduce the probability of a currency crisis, but are not statistically significant in their 
prediction of currency crises. This shows that credit rating agencies, while they are able to 
predict possible defaults, fail when predicting currency crises. This is despite the strong 
empirical link between currency crises and default. As such, this provides an explanation for 
rating agencies’ oversight during the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995. 
Not only are credit rating agencies failing to predict currency crises but they can have 
significant contagion effects during periods of financial crisis. Arezki and Candelon (2011) 
made use of a VAR model covering the 2008 financial crisis. They find that sovereign rating 
downgrades have statistically and economically significant spill-over effects, both across 
countries and financial markets. This implies that rating agencies’ announcements could spur 
financial instability during times of financial crisis. Li et al. (2007) confirmed this result by 
splitting their sample between a crisis period and a tranquil period. In doing so, they found 
contagion amongst stock returns during the crisis period, but not during the tranquil period.  
Furthermore, Li et al. (2007) find that stock markets reacted to rating changes in 
foreign countries more quickly than to the rating changes in their own country. This indicates 
the significant role of foreign country rating changes in exerting strong and swift contagion 
effects during periods of crisis, especially since investors are more attentive to assessing news 
developments in a cross-country environment during periods of crisis. It can be concluded 
that rating agencies not only struggle to forecast periods of financial instability, but that they 
also have significant contagion effects during crisis periods. However, this does leave room 
for improvement. Larrain et al. (1997) and Reisen (1999) both point to the possible 
smoothing impact that ratings agencies can have during these periods of crisis. 
The main issue that ratings agencies can address, as suggested by Larrain et al. (1997), 
is the “Harberger externality”. This effect is where private borrowers do not internalise the 
rising marginal social cost of their private borrowing that arises from the upward-rising 
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supply of foreign capital. In simpler terms, private borrowers borrow too much capital when 
ratings are too high. As such, they could be increasing their borrowing even when the 
economy is in decline. Larrain et al. (1997) argue that if rating agencies could lead rather than 
lag financial markets by acquiring advanced knowledge and superior information, they could 
increase the cost of borrowing and reduce excessive lending before the “Harberger externality” 
sets in place.  
Reisen (1999) supports this claim through the use of an event study that explores the 
link between credit ratings and sovereign yield spreads between 1989 and 1997, when the 
Asian crisis set in. He finds that ratings downgrades tend to widen yield spreads significantly, 
but part of the rise precedes the ratings downgrade. He however, finds no significant impact 
of upgrades on yield spreads. He concluded from the study that rating agencies have the 
potential to moderate euphoria among investors if they lead rather than lag the changes in 
yield spread. Larrain at al. (1997) and Reisen (1999) thus both argue that with advanced 
knowledge where ratings precede changes in financial markets and provide new information 
to markets, ratings agencies can avoid currency crises, moderate investor euphoria and 
ultimately dampen the effects of a financial crisis and its contagion amongst economies.  
2.4 Ratings changes effects on bonds & stocks 
 
In assessing the dynamics of ratings changes, an array of financial instruments and 
indices have been examined from CDS’s to the financial openness of an economy. What 
needs to be specifically addressed however, are the effects of ratings changes on stocks and 
bonds, as these instruments are the focus of the current study. 
Micu et al. (2006) make the following assumptions as to how credit ratings affect 
returns of bonds and stocks. Credit ratings have a direct effect on bonds as they relate directly 
to the risk inherent within a bond. If a downgrade or any other negative rating even occurs, 
there will be more risk associated with bonds, thus the risk premium will increase and bond 
spreads should widen (nominal rates increase). With equities, Micu et al. (2006) note that the 
possible effect is more ambiguous. The reaction depends on the reason for the ratings 
announcement. If the ratings downgrade is motivated by the fact that the issuers’ financial 
prospective is deteriorating, such as their earnings are expected to decline, then this should 
lead to a decline in the stock price. If, however, the negative rating is due to an increase in the 
financial leverage of the firm, this should have the opposite effect. Share prices and returns 
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should increase. Micu et al. (2006) state that the reason being that if the firm is more 
leveraged, there is a transfer of wealth from debt holders to equity holders. Increased leverage 
should lead to higher profits for the firm, assuming the firm is not in decline and operating as 
normal.  
An empirical assessment of the effects of ratings on stocks was done by Barron, Clare, 
and Thomas, in 1997. Their results found that downgrades in long term bond ratings lead, on 
average, to a negative excess return of over -3.5% on the day of the announcement. After five 
days, the cumulative effect still remains at around -3%. This paper showed that rating 
changes can have significant effects for the individual stocks of a company. The results are in 
line with the hypothesis of Micu et al. (2006) that downgrades affect stocks through declines 
in expected earnings instead of through the leverage of the firm.  
Brooks et al. (2004) provide further evidence of the effect in an event study that 
covered upgrades as well as downgrades. The study found that rating upgrades have no 
significant effect on abnormal stock returns, but downgrades had a significant decrease in 
average abnormal returns of -1.79% on the day that the downgrade occurred, a result that was 
less severe than those of Barron et al. (1997) but was consistent across developing and 
emerging nations.  
As such, not only do ratings changes have significant impacts on stock returns but 
they also impact on bond returns. Cantor and Pacher in their 1996 study, analysed the effect 
of credit rating announcements on sovereign yield spreads. A regression of an average credit 
rating compiled by Cantor and Pacher on bond spreads was found to be statistically 
significant, when the average credit rating was excluded and macroeconomic variables such 
as Per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, fiscal balance, external balance, external debt, a 
development dummy variable, and default dummy were included. Only external debt, the 
development dummy and default dummy were statistically significant, but when the average 
rating was included with the macroeconomic variables, only the average rating was 
significant, suggesting that ratings encompassed all the relevant information that was needed 
to predict changes in the spread. 
In a contrasting study, Larrain et al. (1997) made use of a granger causality test that 
looked at the impact of ratings announcements on yield spreads for 26 countries of which 10 
were classified as emerging markets. Larrain et al. (1997) concluded that ratings caused 
changes in yield spreads and vice versa. Then with the use of an event study, they found that 
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29 days preceding a review for a possible downgrade, spreads rose by 25 percentage points. 
29 days before a nation is put on positive outlook, yield spreads were found to fall by eight 
percentage points. In contrast to Cantor and Pacher’s (1996) study, even though bond spreads 
were found to rise and fall before a negative/positive outlook, the effects were not found to be 
statistically significant. This is when the entire sample of countries is used, but there is a 
significant impact found when the event study is replicated only for emerging markets. 
Ratings changes have been shown to have effects on the returns of bonds as seen 
above, but the severity of these effects depends on the investment grade of the bond. 
Jaramillo and Tejada (2011) found that investment grade status reduces financing costs 
significantly. With the use of a panel regression that incorporated 25 emerging market 
economies, Jaramillo and Tejada (2011) showed that, as expected, bond spreads for 
investment grade countries are 36% lower than for speculative grade nations. If, however, a 
nation is already in investment grade status then a one notch upgrade can lead to a 5% to 10% 
reduction on bond spreads. This is contrasted with the result that a one notch increase in their 
sovereign ratings leads to no reduction in bond spreads if the nation is already in speculative 
grade status. It can be concluded that bond spreads are more responsive to ratings changes 
when the bond is of a higher grade.  
Larrain et al. (1997) added to these results in that a significant impact was found only 
for investment-grade, emerging-market securities. There was no significant effect of 
announcements on speculative, or investment grade bonds when both developed and 
emerging markets were considered. However, when only looking at emerging market 
investment grade bonds, there was a significant effect. Cantor and Pacher (1996) however, 
had a finding that objects to that of Jaramillo and Tejada (2011) and Larrain et al. (1997). 
Cantor and Pacher (1996) find that for speculative grade bonds, rating announcements had a 
statistically significant effect at the 1% level. Investment grade bonds however, had no 
significant effect from ratings announcements. Due to the conflict between findings, it is 
uncertain if speculative or investment grade bonds are more sensitive to rating changes.  
What is of interest to the current paper, are the effects of credit rating changes on the 
volatility of stocks and bonds. Heinke (2006) studied the influence of rating classifications 
and watch listings on the credit spread volatility of plain vanilla bonds. The data consisted of 
German Eurobonds from international issuers that experienced a rating change between the 
period of 1984 and 1996. Heinke’s (2006) results show that credit spread volatility is higher 
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for bonds with a speculative grade as compared to investment grade bonds.  In addition, the 
results show that for downgrades, credit spread volatility does indeed rise significantly while 
upgrade lead to significant decreases in credit spread volatility. However, Heinke’s (2006) 
paper addresses credit spread volatility, and does not explicitly address bond volatility as this 
paper seeks to. 
2.5 Bias towards downgrades 
 
The literature shows that ratings changes do in fact, have an effect not only on the 
economy and private investment, but also on a nation’s bond and stock returns. This effect is 
however, argued to be asymmetric with downgrades having a larger impact than upgrades.  
Gande and Parsley (2005) state that the reasons why positive rating events might have 
no impact on bonds and stocks is that they are anticipated. Government has a higher incentive 
to leak or report on positive news such as positive rating changes and announcements as soon 
as talks have ended with ratings agencies. Thus, negative news would be stifled by 
government to maintain their image, and as such would come as more of a shock to the public 
when a rating change does occur. Another explanation as pointed out by Gande and Parsley is 
that ratings agencies have access to information as supplied by foreign governments. The 
rating agencies might be reluctant to lower rating or outlooks for the fear of being cut off 
from critical information supplied by governments that are not available to the public.  
An event study conducted by Brooks et al. (2004) confirms this effect and shows that 
downgrades lead to larger abnormal stock returns than upgrades. More precisely Brooks et al. 
(2004) found that downgrades have a negative wealth impact on market returns. This was a 
long-standing study that covered the period from 1973 to 2001. Li et al. (2007) also found an 
asymmetric effect of downgrades and upgrades on stock returns in East Asia. Downgrades 
were found to have more of a significant effect than upgrades. Ferreira and Gama (2007) 
found that the effect of downgrades on stock returns are magnified for emerging markets. Sy 
(2002) used a panel data method to show this effect amongst 17 emerging markets and found 
that bond spreads are also affected by this asymmetric effect. Gande and Parsley (2005) 
confirm this asymmetric effect on bonds with the use of a panel regression, where credit 
events included both credit rating changes as well as watch lists. They find evidence of 
downgrades having a significant effect on bond spreads from a country’s own downgrade, but 
not from their own upgrade. 
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Related literature to the asymmetric effect of ratings changes on emerging markets 
finds that while the effect of rating changes on other financial variables might still be 
asymmetric, it might not be of the same nature. Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) make use of a 
standard event study methodology that consists of dollar denominated CDS’s. Ismailescu and 
Kazemi’s (2010) paper investigates the reaction of CDS spreads to credit rating changes and 
the cross-border spill-over effects of these rating changes. They find evidence that CDS’s 
react immediately to positive ratings changes while negative ratings changes are found to 
have no significant effect as they are anticipated by the market (Ismailescu & Kazemi, 2010). 
What can be drawn from Ismailescu and Kazemi’s (2010) study, is that the 
asymmetric effect of downgrades having a significant impact on bonds and stocks might be 
unique to the financial instrument. As such, any conclusion drawn must be exclusive to the 
financial instrument being studied.  
2.6 Contagion 
 
There is an abundance of literature exploring the effects of contagion amongst 
developed and emerging economies. Caporale, Cipollini, and Spagnolo (2005) define 
contagion as being a significant increase in the degree of co-movement between stock returns 
in different countries. In this paper, contagion is defined as an unanticipated shock occurring 
in an event nation (where the shock occurs) that affects the financial variables of not only the 
event nation, but another non-event nation. Volatility spill-over refers directly to shocks in 
the event nation that increase the volatility of the non-event nation’s financial variables. 
Shocks may include unanticipated rating changes as anticipated ratings changes will have no 
effect due to the EMH. Volatility spill-over is included in the concept of contagion, but 
contagion does not specifically refer to spill-over of volatility.  
 
Many papers have emphasised the importance of contagion as a risk to the stability of 
financial markets. Christiansen, in a 2007 study, finds evidence of contagion between US and 
European bond markets. He uses a GARCH volatility spill-over model to show contagion 
effects from the US bond market, to the European bond market. He also examined the spill-
over effects of the aggregate European bond market to individual European bonds. 
Christiansen (2007) finds the US spill-over is less severe than that of EMU countries’ spill-
over into the individual European markets. Billio and Caporin (2010), through the use of a 
simultaneous equation system with GARCH errors, identified mean relations and variance 
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spill-over amongst American and Asian markets. Gallo and Otranto (2008) focused on the 
Asian stock markets of Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, and 
finds evidence of volatility spill-over amongst the regional nations by making use of a 
Markov switching model. Note that these papers only confirm that contagion does occur 
across stocks and bonds but does not provide evidence of contagion resulting from credit 
ratings.  
 
In order to test the empirics of credit ratings on contagion, Grande (2005) set out to 
show if credit rating changes, and changes in outlook caused financial contagion amongst 
bond spreads. Grande (2005) regressed the rating events of event nations on a non-event 
nations bond spreads. The results find that negative news for one country translates into 
increased spreads for all dollars denominated sovereign debt. However, positive events do not 
appear to induce statistically significant spill-over effects. 
Ratings however, seem to induce contagion effects which are amplified by regional 
proximity. In an effort to dissect this specific dynamic of credit ratings, Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2002) look at the effects of sovereign rating changes on bonds and stocks in 
emerging markets. Their findings suggest that spill-over effects are more pronounced on a 
regional level than amongst economic blocks that are non-regional. They find that within 
regions, upgrades and downgrades lead to an average increase in yield of 0.7 percentage 
points, whereas non-regional upgrades and downgrades triggered an average change in 
spreads of only 0.4 percentage points (Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2002). Ferreira and Gama 
(2007) confirm Kaminsky and Schmukler’s findings in that geographic distance is inversely 
related to the spill-over impact of an event nation’s stock exchange to non-event nation’s 
stock exchange. They find in particular, that the proximity of nations and being an emerging 
market amplifies the spill-over that results from a sovereign rating change.  
Upgrades and downgrades can also lead to a decoupling and re-coupling effect on 
nations that are geographically close. Christopher, Kim, and Wu (2012) studied the effects of 
credit ratings on time varying stock and bond market correlations. They find the effects of 
rating changes on stock and bond markets to be heterogeneous. There is a positive relation 
between stock correlations and credit ratings, meaning upgrades lead to increases in stock 
correlations and downgrades reduce the correlation. This implies that a downgrade is seen as 
specific to a nation and leads investors to shift their funds from the downgraded nation to the 
surrounding countries (De-coupling effect). Positive rating changes on the other hand, lead to 
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positive effects of returns on neighbouring nations and the event nation (re-coupling effect). 
(Christopher et al., 2012).  
Contagion of credit ratings is also found to be more pronounced during times of 
financial instability. Li et al. (2007) split their regression results amongst the entire period 
examined, a crisis period during the 1997 Asian crisis and a tranquil period where no 
financial crisis occurred. They found that there was, indeed, contagion during the entire 
period, during the financial crisis period, but not during the tranquil period.  
In a further analysis, Li et al. separated the contagion effects between ratings upgrades 
and downgrades. They found that countries’ own upgrades and downgrades had a significant 
effect on the domestic economy, but the country only responded to downgrades from foreign 
nations and not upgrades. A one notch downgrade in a foreign nation was found to lead to an 
excessive reduction in the stock return of the domestic nation of -0.52% on the same day as 
the downgrade (Li et al., 2007). Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) also found evidence of 
financial crisis exacerbating contagion effects across emerging markets as a whole.  
As mentioned before, the nature of the asymmetric effect of downgrades and upgrades 
depends on the financial instrument. Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), as well as Kang and Min 
(2016), found that only positive ratings changes had a significant effect on CDS’s and this 
effect was also found to be significant to spill-over effects. This is contrasted with Li et al.’s 
(2007) finding where downgrades only have significant contagion effects on stocks, again 
highlighting that the nature of the asymmetric effect of contagion is unique to the financial 
instrument being evaluated. 
With regards to volatility spill-over, Engle et al. (2012) made use a sophisticated 
collection of volatility models for eight East Asian countries from 1995 to 2006. They found 
interdependence of volatility amongst the eight nations and a build-up of volatility 
transmission during the 1997 Asian crisis. This provides evidence of volatility spill-over 
across emerging markets, but Afonso et al. (2014) provide evidence of volatility spill-over 
resulting specifically from credit rating changes. Afonso et al. (2014) conducted a panel 
regression encompassing developed and developing EU nations, with data ranging from 1995 
to 2002. They studied the effects of credit ratings on stock and bond market volatilities and 
found contagion of volatility spill-overs to be present. Amongst European financial markets, 
they found that upgrades lead to a decrease in volatility, while downgrades lead to an increase 
in volatility across nations.   
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3 CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Data  
 
The data used for ratings changes were obtained from Bloomberg and includes ratings 
changes for nine different rating agencies. In addition to the three main American ratings 
agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poor and Fitch), the data includes ratings changes from other 
agencies (DBRS, R&I, Japan CRA, Dagong, Duff & Thompson). This is vital because the 
majority of papers cited only used the three main ratings agencies (S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch). 
The reason for this is that, as Reisen (1999) notes, the three market leaders cover 
approximately 80% of sovereign credit ratings. However, for a holistic view of the effects of 
ratings agencies, the study utilises the use of a comprehensive data set, incorporating six 
additional agencies.  
The data is daily data and has run for 26 years over the period of 1 January 1990 to 
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 September 2016. The credit rating data was then transformed into discrete dummy 
variables in order to reflect the decisions of ratings agencies. On a given date t and country i 
the dummy variables up and down assume the following values: 
𝑢𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠
0, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
(1) 
A dummy variable for up and down was used instead of a numerical scale because the 
credit ratings of agencies are assigned by rating committees, where a large dose of judgment 
is used. In addition, some of the criteria for rating a sovereign are not quantitative, let alone 
quantifiable (FitzGerald, 2009). As such, to avoid any biases that might occur from ordinal 
ranking, dummy variables are used to indicate an upward or downward movement in a 
sovereign’s credit rating. Contagion credit rating dummy variables for the analysis of 




1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
0, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
    (2) 
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛−𝑖𝑖 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
0, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
The World Bank classifies countries into four different categories: low-income (LI), 
lower middle income (LMI), upper middle income (UMI) and high-income (HI). All LI, LMI 
and UMI economies are categorised as emerging markets. For the purpose of this study, 
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emerging markets were classified as lower and middle income, in accordance with the World 
Bank (The World Bank, 2016).  
Only 31 of the 94 emerging market countries for which data was attainable had 
sufficient capital markets that were deep and liquid enough to draw empirical results. The 31 
countries required well-functioning stock and bond markets and in addition, were required to 
have had at least one sovereign ratings change by S&P over the period being assessed in 
order to be included in the study. The 31 countries are Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Israel, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela.  
The data set comprises daily stock and bond indices for the 31 countries and was 
obtained from Bloomberg. Daily data was used as with an increase in the frequency of data 
comes an increase in persistence (Nelson, 1991). Daily data thus allowed for a more accurate 
analysis of the persistence of credit rating shocks from one day to the next. These indices 
were indicative of the stock or bond market, as a whole, in the respective country and the 
bond indices are government issue 10-year bond indices.  
3.2 Empirical Method 
 
A fixed effects panel data method is used in order to make efficient use of data that is 
both cross sectional and time series, by providing a single equation describing the 
relationship amongst a multiple of countries and over many time periods. It allows for results 
to be drawn where the data may be lacking variability due to the nature of ratings changes 
being infrequent. In addition, a fixed effect panel regression allows for the isolation of 
variables that are not common amongst countries, giving a true measure of statistical 
significance (Brooks, 2014).  
In addition, an EGARCH (Exponential generalised autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity) model is used to generate the stock and bond volatilities that are fed into 
the fixed effects panel data estimation - Heteroscedasticity meaning non-constant variance. 
This model is utilised at it accounts for the leverage effect found in financial time series 
where negative shocks to returns increase the predictable volatility to a greater extent than do 
positive shocks of a similar magnitude (Asai & McAleer, 2011). All regressions are done 
with Eviews statistical package. 
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Stock market returns (𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡) at time t for each country are defined as the differenced log 
returns of the stock price indexes and are thus of the first order. For the bond indices, returns 
(𝑟𝐵𝑖,𝑡) are defined as the difference in the log yields of the bond indices. In order to model the 
volatilities of the bond and stock indices, an ARCH model could be useful as it allows for the 
modelling of heteroskedastic financial time series, which is often the case with financial 
return series. ARCH models also allow for the modelling of volatility that occur in bursts 
(Brooks, 2014). However, a GARCH model, as suggested by Bollerslev (1986), provides a 
marginally better fit than that of an ARCH model. Neither of these models is utilised in this 
study. 
Moreover, Nelson (1991) points out some of the features of financial time series that 
GARCH models are unable to account for. Firstly, researchers have found a negative 
correlation between current returns and future returns volatility, where negative returns have 
a more severe impact than positive return shocks. The reason, as stated by Black (1976), is 
that if the stock price of a firm decreased, this inevitably means that its capital structure will 
change and its leverage will have increased. Investors then view this as being a riskier stock 
and as such, downwards revisions in the returns of a stock lead to larger effects on volatility 
than upwards shocks. Nelson (1991) and Ding et al. (1993), using daily data on stock index 
returns, find that large positive as well as negative unanticipated returns lead to an upward 
revision in the conditional volatility, although negative shocks of similar magnitude lead to 
larger revisions. GARCH models rule out the possibility of modelling this asymmetric feature 
as they assume a symmetric relationship between past volatility and future volatility.  
Secondly, GARCH models impose parameter restrictions such as having no negative 
coefficients. This however, will restrict the dynamics of the conditional variance process and 
can often be violated.  
Thirdly, Nelson (1991) points to the difficulties in interpreting the persistence of financial 
time series modelled by a GARCH model. The reason is that GARCH models shocks may 
persist in one norm and then die out in another. 
In order to calculate the daily parametric volatilities of the bond and stock returns in this 
study, the EGARCH model is used. As mentioned before, shocks in financial time series 
volatility tend to have an asymmetric effect on future volatility for which the GARCH model 
does not account. This is known as the leverage effect where negative shocks to returns 
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increase the predictable volatility to a greater extent than do positive shocks of a similar 
magnitude (Asai & McAleer, 2011).  
Nelson (1991) points to the main advantage of the EGARCH models in that they allow 
for asymmetries in the return data. The model allows for positive and negative ratings 
changes to have different effects on volatility, and thus factors in the asymmetric volatility 
phenomenon. Furthermore, the EGARCH model also addressed the second issue with 
GARCH models, where they impose restrictions on the coefficients to ensure volatilities are 
non-negative. To correct for this, EGARCH models make use of the log of the conditional 
variance ln(𝜎2𝑡). This ensures positive values for all conditional volatiles. The EGARCH 
model deals with the third issue by providing a coefficient whose explicit purpose is to give a 
measure of persistence, providing ease of interpretation (Nelson, 1991). 
For the EGARCH specification, we assume that stock returns follow a random walk and 
are represented by the following specification 𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 .The error terms comprise 
stock and bond return volatility in addition to 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 which are i.i.d t-distributed error terms with 
mean zero.  𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝜎𝑖,𝑡+1𝑧𝑖,𝑡+1 where 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 =
𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝜎𝑖,𝑡⁄ . The EGARCH (1,1) specification 
comes from the original formulation as per Nelson (1991). 











]     (3) 
In equation (3) 𝜔 serves as a constant while 𝛽  serves as a measure of persistence 
showing that past volatility shocks will have an effect on future volatility. The coefficient 𝛾 
gives the sign of the expected relationship between stock returns and volatility and it will be 
negative if higher returns lead to lower future volatility. A negative result was found in the 
empirics of this study. 𝛼 is the coefficient that measures the asymmetric volatility phenomena 
and is expected to show that negative returns will have a larger effect on volatility than 
positive returns of the same magnitude. If the coefficient 𝛼 is positive while the coefficient 𝛾 
is negative, then a negative shock has a higher impact on volatility than a positive shock 
because |𝛾 − 𝛼| ≥ |𝛾 + 𝛼|(Nelson, 1991). It should be noted that the only information used 
for the estimation in equation (3) is the stock and bond returns. No upgrade or downgrade 
information has been utilised, a yet. The results of the EGARCH estimation are reported in 
Table 2 for each of the 31 countries.  
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In order to study the reaction of stock and bond market volatilities to ratings upgrades 
and downgrades, a fixed effects panel data regression is used. This is a common method used 
in the study of credit ratings and authors such as Erdem and Varli (2014), Montes et al. 
(2016), Chen et al. (2013), Li et al (2007), Grande (2005), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) 
all make use of a panel regressions. The specific formula for the Panel regression use in this 
study is shown in Eq (4). 





𝑗=0  (4) 
The dependant variable log(𝜎𝑖,𝑡) are the conditional volatilities for stocks and bonds, 
filtered from the specification in Eq (3).  𝜇𝑖 are the country fixed effects and 
𝑢𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 are the dummy variables that were specified in Eq (1); representing 
the upgrades and downgrades of any ratings agency for a given country. The dummy 
variables are lagged in order to show persistence in the effects of upgrades and downgrades 
on volatilities. The coefficient 𝛽 gives a measure or persistence and 𝑋𝑡−1and is a vector of 
control variables such as dummy variables for daily, weekly and annual effects. The results of 
Eq (4) are displayed in Table 3. 
The effects of contagion amongst countries is investigated by including dummy 
variables for upgrades and downgrades, where the variable includes upgrades or downgrades 
from every other nation other than itself. This way the effects of ratings shocks in other 
nations on the host nations stock and bond volatilities can be investigated. The specification 



















     (5) 
Eq (5) is specified the same as Eq (4) with log(𝜎𝑖,𝑡) representing the conditional 
volatilities, 𝜇𝑖 representing country fixed effects, 𝑢𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 reflecting the ratings 
decisions of ratings agencies and 𝑋𝑡−1  are control variables for daily, weekly and annual 
effects. In addition, 𝑢𝑝−𝑖
𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛−𝑖𝑖,𝑡−𝑗reflect upgrades and downgrades in any other 
country other than country i.  The magnitude of the contagious upgrades and downgrades are 
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reflected by the coefficients 𝜙𝑗&𝛿𝑗 which are lagged in order to show the persistence of the 
contagious effects. The results of Eq (5) are displayed in Table 5 and are split amongst the 
total sample of emerging markets according to continent. Thus, contagious effects are shown 
separately for South America, Asia and Europe. Europe, for example, has the contagious 
dummy variables 𝑢𝑝−𝑖
𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛−𝑖𝑖,𝑡−𝑗which only reflect upgrades and downgrades in 
any country other than country i for the Europe area only.   
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4 CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
Table 1: Average of stock and sovereign bond market volatilities for different rating 
categories 
 
Note: This table reports the average daily volatilities of stock and sovereign bond indices, historical volatilities for each of the different 
rating categories (AA,..,SD). The volatilities are calculated by first calculating the variance for the period in which the country was in a 
specified ratings category. These variances were then summed and divided by the number of periods in which each and all the countries 
were in a specific ratings category, to give the average daily volatility for that ratings category.  
 
In Table 1, the average volatilities for both stocks and bonds are reported in order to 
assess if a lower rating will on average lead to more volatility in stocks and bonds. From the 
results, there seems to be a clear increase in volatility of stocks, as the country’s average 
credit rating deteriorates. However, this pattern is not as clear amongst the bond markets. The 
results are in line with studies such as Heinke (2006), who finds evidence of bonds of a 
speculative grade having higher volatilities than investment grade. Jaramillo and Tejada 
(2011) highlight this as a stylised fact, where sovereigns that have better credit ratings tend to 
have lower spreads. This supports the results in Table 1 if bonds spreads can be assumed to 
proxy for bond volatility.  
From the results, it is concluded that on average of the emerging markets, speculative 
grade nations experience approximately 2.76 times more volatility in their stock markets than 
their investment grade counterparts. As for bond markets, while there is no clear pattern or 





















increased volatility with a decreased credit rating, speculative grade nations experience 4.93 
times more volatility in their bond markets, than investment grade nations do. It should be 
noted that an AAA rating was excluded due to lack of emerging markets of an AAA rating. 
The same applies for AA rated bonds in our emerging market data set.   
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Table 2: Summary of EGARCH estimation results Eq (3) 
 
Note: Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of the EGARCH model in Eq (3). Obs indicates the number of observations included in the 
regression.  
*  Represents statistical significance at 10%. 
** Represents statistical significance at 5%. 
***  Represents statistical significance at 1%. 
Country Slope ƴ (C4) Asymmetry α (C3) Persistence β (C5) Obs.
Stock Market
Brazil -0.051 *** 0.217 *** -0.184 *** 9755
Bulgaria -0.009 *** 0.171 *** 0.994 *** 5806
China 0.014 *** 0.154 *** 0.992 *** 9403
Colombia -0.058 *** 0.230 *** 0.961 *** 5177
Croatia -0.007 *** 0.161 *** 0.991 *** 5208
Egypt -0.019 *** 0.132 *** 0.966 *** 6833
Greece -0.011 *** 0.070 *** 0.998 *** 9755
Hungary -0.027 *** 0.184 *** 0.973 *** 9389
India -0.015 *** 0.113 *** 0.995 *** 9755
Indonesia -0.013 *** 0.138 *** 0.993 *** 9755
Israel -0.038 *** 0.091 *** 0.992 *** 9024
Jamaica 0.027 *** 0.229 *** 0.963 *** 9755
Lithuania -0.004 *** 0.108 *** 0.994 *** 6100
Malaysia -0.034 *** 0.126 *** 0.996 *** 9755
Mexico -0.049 *** 0.053 *** 0.994 *** 8276
Nigeria 0.024 *** 0.183 *** 0.986 *** 6832
Pakistan -0.032 *** 0.148 *** 0.970 *** 9083
Panama 0.011 *** 0.554 *** -0.191 *** 9025
Peru -0.011 *** 0.212 *** 0.983 *** 9754
Philippines -0.036 *** 0.111 *** 0.990 *** 9755
Poland -0.003 *** 0.121 *** 0.993 *** 9285
Romania -0.015 *** 0.179 *** 0.984 *** 6934
Russia -0.030 *** 0.126 *** 0.993 *** 6934
Slovakia 0.011 *** 0.125 *** 0.973 *** 8403
Slovenia -0.029 *** 0.201 *** 0.968 *** 4917
South Africa -0.060 *** 0.106 *** 0.990 *** 7749
Thailand -0.040 *** 0.139 *** 0.983 *** 9755
Turkey -0.007 *** 0.108 *** 0.995 *** 9755
Ukraine -0.009 *** 0.178 *** 0.984 *** 6822
Venezuela 0.027 *** 0.224 *** 0.942 *** 8296
Bond Market
Brazil 0.077 *** 0.137 *** 0.861 *** 3458
Bulgaria 0.040 *** 0.167 *** 0.093 *** 3098
China -0.002 *** 0.048 *** 0.952 *** 3959
Colombia 0.007 *** 0.176 *** 0.888 *** 5335
Croatia 0.609 *** 1.414 *** 0.248 *** 388
Egypt -0.270 *** -1.018 *** 0.013 1725
Greece -0.057 *** 0.241 *** -0.333 *** 3486
Hungary 0.013 *** 0.145 *** 0.983 *** 3486
India -0.009 *** 0.115 *** 0.983 *** 6456
Indonesia 0.071 *** 0.139 *** 0.964 *** 4805
Israel -0.041 *** 0.374 *** -0.437 *** 2004
Jamaica -0.048 *** 0.124 *** 0.995 *** 3990
Lithuania 0.506 *** 0.996 *** 0.409 *** 925
Malaysia 0.118 *** 0.163 *** 0.786 *** 6174
Mexico 0.049 *** 0.342 *** 0.698 *** 2353
Nigeria -0.084 *** -0.021 *** 0.968 *** 1806
Pakistan -0.141 *** 0.204 *** -0.266 *** 4474
Panama -0.062 *** -0.006 *** 0.956 *** 1922
Peru -0.031 *** 0.272 *** -0.340 *** 3830
Philippines 0.089 *** 0.065 *** 0.880 *** 6625
Poland 0.072 *** 0.063 *** 0.883 *** 6322
Romania -0.021 *** 0.132 *** 0.992 *** 1926
Russia 0.142 *** 0.105 *** 0.892 *** 2352
Slovakia -0.060 *** 0.010 *** 1.003 *** 5202
Slovenia -0.049 *** 0.231 *** 0.978 *** 2017
South Africa 0.090 *** 0.128 *** 0.894 *** 6163
Thailand 0.018 *** 0.318 *** -0.147 *** 6083
Turkey 0.005 *** 0.092 *** 0.989 *** 2424
Ukraine 0.102 *** 0.028 *** 0.975 *** 2024




Table 2 reports the EGARCH results for each of the individual nations and separates 
the results amongst stocks and bonds. From the results, we can see that due to the high 
significance of the coefficient 𝛼 there is indeed an asymmetric relationship between returns 
and volatility of returns for both stocks and bonds. From the methodology, it is known that if 
the coefficient 𝛼 is positive while the coefficient 𝛾 is negative, then a negative shock has a 
higher impact on future volatility than a positive shock. This is seen to be the case in the 
results for stocks and as such, negative return shocks are in fact more significant that positive 
return shocks. For bonds, however, the result is mixed with some bonds showing positive 
returns shocks to have more of a significant effect than negative return shocks. Overall, the 
results are in line with the findings of Nelson (1991), Ding et al. (1993) and Black (1976).  
The coefficient 𝛽 is statistically significant for stock and bonds and as such, returns can be 




Table 3: Estimation results of stock and bond market volatilities with 3 main agencies (S&P, 
Moody’s and Fitch) Eq (4) 
 
Note: This table reports the estimation results that correspond to the regression equation in Eq (4). The t-statistics for the statistical 
significance of the estimated coefficients are reported below their corresponding coefficients. Negative t-stats are reported in parenthesis. 
Control variables, X, in Eq (4) include daily, monthly and annual dummies. P-values (F -tests) for joint statistical significance are also 
reported in the table. 
*  Represents statistical significance at 10%. 
**  Represents statistical significance at 5%. 
***  Represents statistical significance at 1%. 
 
Table 3 reports the estimation results for Eq (4) using two lags for the three main 
rating agencies. Two lags have found to be sufficient to capture the dynamics of rating 
changes and their effects over time (Afonso et al., 2014).  
 
An asymmetric effect is observed for stocks, showing that rating downgrades have a 
significant effect on stock volatilities while upgrades have no effect. This provides 
confirmation that downgrades not only affect stock returns but also continue to influence the 
second moments of these variables. This finding is in line with Afonso et al.’s  (2014) study 
Events Stock Market Bond Market
Upgrade t 0.0000014656 0.0000235828
(0.320) (1.308)
t - 1 0.0000008901 0.0000492918 ***
(0.193) (2.641)
t - 2 0.0000004983 0.0000088437
(0.108) (0.473)
Downgrade t 0.0000260704 *** 0.0001556258 **
(5.541) (10.197)
t - 1 0.0000073098 -0.0001157079 *
(1.553) (-7.576)
t - 2 0.0000030660 0.0000336933
(0.651) (2.207)







F - Test 3rd Lag 67258.06945 *** 2270.878523 ***
F - Test 5th Lag 63877.89508 *** 2111.495515 ***
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of the EU stock market. In addition, these results provide evidence to the theory advanced by 
Gande and Parsley (2005), in that rating downgrades are unanticipated, because governments 
are reluctant to reveal negative rating news. However, when it comes to bonds, no 
asymmetric effect is observed. Upgrades and downgrades are shown to have a statistically 
significant effect on the variance of bonds. This is contrasted with Afonso et al. (2014) who 
finds an asymmetric effect with bonds and no effect of upgrades on bond volatility.  
 
The results add further findings to studies such as Brooks et al. (2004), Li et al. (2007), 
Sy (2002), Gande and Parsley (2005), which find that downgrades are likely to have a 
significant effect on bond and stock returns in comparison to upgrades. These results show 
that, in addition, volatility is affected by rating changes. It should be noted that the size of the 
coefficients is close to negligible, but still remains statistically significant for downgrades and 
upgrades for bonds. An explanation could be that ratings changes tend to cluster as the same 
point in time further detracting from each individual agency’s rating change significance.  
 
In terms of the direction of the effects, upgrades increase bond volatility after a one 
day lag while downgrades’ effect on bond volatility is more ambiguous, increasing bond 
volatility on the event day and then decreasing bond volatility after a one day lag. For stocks, 
downgrades are found to increase stock volatility on the event day.  
 
In both the regressions, the full 31 countries are not included, the reason being that 
while the excluded nations had sufficient data for stock and bond indices there was not 
enough variation in some of the nations’ data, or there were collinearity issues, leading to a 
near singular or singular matrix result for the regression. As such, nations that exhibited this 
error were excluded from the regression. The R-squared in both regressions are also found to 
be particularly high with a value of 97% for stocks and 75% for bonds. This is the result of 





Table 4: Estimation results of stock and bond market volatilities with nine agencies Eq (4)  
 
Note: This table reports the estimation results that correspond to the regression equation in Eq (4). The t-statistics for the statistical 
significance of the estimated coefficients are reported below their corresponding coefficients. Negative t-stats are reported in parenthesis. 
Control variables, X, in Eq (4) include daily, monthly and annual dummies. P-values (F -tests) for joint statistical significance are also 
reported in the table.  
*  Represents statistical significance at 10%. 
**  Represents statistical significance at 5%. 
***  Represents statistical significance at 1%. 
 
Table 4 reports the estimation results for Eq (4) with the use of rating changes from 
nine rating agencies. An asymmetric effect is observed, showing that rating downgrades have 
a significant effect on stock and bond volatilities while upgrades have no effect. This 
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provides further confirmation that downgrades not only affect stock and bond returns but also 
continue to influence the second moments of these variables.  
 
These results are directly in line with those found in Afonso et al.’s  (2014) study of 
the EU stock and bond market. They also reinforce the results of papers such as Brooks et al. 
(2004), Li et al. (2007), Sy (2002), Gande and Parsley (2005) in that downgrades are likely to 
have a significant effect on bond and stock returns in comparison to upgrades. The results in 
Table 4 do however, vary from those found in Table 3. When nine rating agencies are used, 
there is no evidence of upgrades having a statistically significant effect on bond volatility, 
however when only the three main rating agencies were utilised (S&P, Moodys and Fitch) 
evidence of upgrades having an effect on bond volatility is observed.  
 
In terms of the direction of the effect, downgrades increased stock volatility on the 
event day, and in the second day. For bonds, downgrades only increased the volatility on the 
third day lag. In both the regressions, the full 31 countries are not included as some countries’ 
data exhibited a singular matrix error. As such, nations that exhibited this error were excluded 
from the regression. The R-squared in both regressions are also found to be particularly high 
with a value of 98% for stocks and 99% for bonds. This is the result of the persistence of 
shocks in stocks and bond returns leading to high R-squared values. It is interesting to note 
that 2008 was one of the only years controlled for that held any statistical significance and 







Table 5: Estimation results of regressions of stock and bond market volatilities Eq (4), 
alternative volatility measures using 9 rating agencies  
 
Note: This table reports the estimation results that corresponds to the regression equation in Eq (4) using volatilities that are filtered based 
on: (i) GJR-GARCH model (Glosten et al., 1993), (ii) EGARCH model with the Gaussian distribution (Nelson, 1991). Control variables, X, 
in Eq (4) include daily, monthly and annual dummies. Negative t-stats are reported in parenthesis. 
*  Represents statistical significance at 10%. 
**  Represents statistical significance at 5%. 
***  Represents statistical significance at 1%. 
 
 As a robustness check, an alternative volatility model is estimated, namely the GJR-
GARCH (Glosten, Jagannathan, & Runkle, 1993) model and compared to the previously 
estimated EGARCH model. The GJR-GARCH model allows for possible asymmetries in the 
effect of current return shocks on conditional volatility (the leverage effect). The model 
however, still imposes non-negativity constraints, as is a feature with GARCH models 
(Brooks, 2014). For both of the models, the corresponding volatilities are filtered and then 
used to estimate Eq (3). As can be seen, the results are robust when compared to Table 4 with 
upgrades being found to have no statistically significant effect on emerging market bond and 
stocks, while downgrades are found to have a highly significant effect within the three day 
window. 
  
Events Stock Market Bond Market
Upgrade t -0.0000050171 0.0000005830 0.0000143108 0.0000000667
(0.352) 0.137 0.332 0.004
t - 1 -0.0000011182 0.0000006071 0.0000580708 0.0000016346
(0.078) 0.143 1.328 0.108
t - 2 -0.0000004421 -0.0000000292 0.0000102742 0.0000049870
(0.030) (0.006) 0.253 0.329
Downgrade t 0.0000403898 *** 0.0000267774 *** 0.0001537164 *** 0.0000029821
2.858 6.777 5.026 0.207
t - 1 0.0000002814 0.0000070491 * 0.0001683575 *** 0.0000017504
0.019 1.784 5.507 0.121
t - 2 0.0000107875 -0.0000040594 0.0000585840 * 0.0000411765 ***
0.736 (1.027) (1.915) (2.860)
Lagged Volatility 0.9679182591 *** 0.9794630127 *** 0.7608724157 *** 0.9869178080 ***
1854.57 2057.35 289.97 1170.42
R^2 0.946 0.971 0.652 0.977
Observations 230328 177201 60672 42087
Countries 28 22 27 18
#Upgrades 157 132 153 90
#Downgrades 158 146 156 75
GJR GARCH EGARCH Gaussian DistributionGJR GARCH EGARCH Gaussian Distribution
35 
 
Table 6: Estimation results of regressions of stock and bond market volatilities with 3 main agencies (S& P, Moody’s and Fitch) Eq (5)  
 
Note: Table 5 reports the estimation results that correspond to the regression in Eq (5). Negative t-stats are reported in parenthesis. Control variables, X, in  Eq (5) include daily, monthly and annual dummies.  
*  Represents statistical significance at 10%. 
**  Represents statistical significance at 5%. 
***  Represents statistical significance at 1%. 
Events Stock Market Bond Market
Emerging Markets South America Europe Asia Emerging Markets Europe Asia
Upgrade t 0.0000015261 0.0000051547 -0.0000009214 0.0000042445 0.0000237623 -0.0000001477 0.0000035844
(0.333) (0.200) (-0.160) (0.470) (1.318) (-0.003) (1.057)
t - 1 0.0000009595 -0.0000020255 -0.0000003461 0.0000091008 0.0000492474 0.0001395167 0.0000149798
(0.208) (-0.078) (-0.059) (1.032) (2.639) ** (2.986) *** (4.426) ***
t - 2 0.0000004945 -0.0000021049 0.0000061098 -0.0000045986 0.0000088333 0.0000909790 0.0000004465
(0.107) (-0.082) (1.050) (-0.510) (0.473) (1.946) (0.1319)
Downgrade t 0.0000262206 *** -0.0000133138 0.0000048367 0.0001240709 *** 0.0001556199 *** 0.0002797113 *** 0.0000167237 **
(5.573) (-0.457) (0.853) (11.534) (10.196) (9.737) (2.477)
t - 1 0.0000070312 -0.0000097270 0.0000087022 0.0000020797 -0.0001155459 *** -0.0000326729 0.0000084633
(1.494) (-0.334) (1.535) (0.1912) (-7.565) (-1.133) (1.253)
t - 2 0.0000028633 0.0000188830 -0.0000002540 0.0000058076 0.0000338422 ** 0.0000332060 -0.0000033701
(0.608) (0.648) (-0.044) (0.534) (2.217) (1.155) (-0.499)
t -0.0000014520 * -0.0000017473 -0.0000019962 -0.0000018207 -0.0000018071 -0.0000025524 -0.0000002901
(-1.724) (-0.359) (-1.516) (-1.149) (-0.464) (-0.251) (-0.448)
t - 1 -0.0000013269 0.0000019636 -0.0000012363 -0.0000017818 0.0000005505 0.0000062345 0.0000002100
(-1.569) (0.402) (-0.935) (-1.120) (0.140) (0.6104) (0.322)
t - 2 -0.0000011624 -0.0000069427 -0.0000009951 0.0000000262 -0.0000037862 -0.0000011029 0.0000002985
(-1.374) (-1.421) (-0.752) (0.016) (-0.964) (-0.108) (0.459)
t -0.0000007199 -0.0000078201 -0.0000031912 ** 0.0000041606 ** 0.0000034465 0.0000008866 0.0000004742
(-0.777) (-1.479) (-2.152) (2.431) (0.807) (0.077) (0.592)
t - 1 0.0000052608 *** -0.0000041053 0.0000062824 *** 0.0000111931 *** 0.0000022697 0.0000059614 -0.0000002348
(5.684) (-0.776) (4.240) (6.538) (0.532) (0.520) (-0.293)
t - 2 0.0000037704 *** 0.0000032006 0.0000070694 -0.0000008130 -0.0000020712 -0.0000087346 0.0000002607
(4.074) (0.605) (4.772) (-0.474) (-0.485) (-0.760) (0.325)
0.9763944539 *** 0.9455351809 *** 0.9773085371 *** 0.98769128 *** 0.6325964144 *** 0.020313488 ** 0.866170642 ***
(1978.811) (389.843) (1013.902) (1493.703) (165.501) (2.184) (182.643)
R^2 0.964254[0.225710] 0.911448[0.163941] 0.968231[0.281813] 0.980445[0.176102] 0.754494[0.571070] 0.680362[0.675227] 0.874684[0.168035]
Observations 189612 18050 47640 54300 39216 11379 6049
Countries 23 3 6 6 10 3 3
#Upgrades 96 14 33 23 61 15 8
#Downgrades 89 9 36 16 66 25 8
#Upgrades (Other) 2993 338 640 783 1682 387 260






Table 6 reports the results of the estimation for stock and bond markets but with 
contagion effects considered as well. The contagion effects are represented by the coefficient  
𝜙𝑗  for upgrades under the heading “upgrade others” and 𝛿𝑗 for downgrades under the 
heading “Downgrade others”. It is found that contagion tends to magnify when countries are 
geographically close rather than when they are part of an economic block (Kaminsky & 
Schmukler, 2002). As a result of this fact, the results are split amongst the continents of 
South America, Europe and Asia including a regression for all emerging markets. 
 When looking at emerging markets as a whole, there is no evidence found of upgrades 
having an effect on stock volatility while downgrades are found to have a statistically 
significant effect. Both upgrades and downgrades from other nations are found to have a 
contagion effect on stocks. The same results are found amongst Asian nations, however, for 
South American nations, no statistically significant effect is found while for Europe, only 
contagion downgrades gave a notable effect. The reason for no statistically significant results 
for South America could be the result of the lack of countries with sufficient data and also the 
lack of rating changes for the three nations included. For Europe, the lack of an effect from 
downgrades could also be the result of data from only using three rating agencies.  
 Downgrades and upgrades from other nations are found to have no contagion effects 
amongst emerging markets, Europe or Asia. South America was excluded due to matrix error 
issues. In addition, no asymmetric effect is found; with upgrades as well as downgrades 
having a statistically significant effect on bond volatility.  
The lack of a significant contagion effect of credit rating on bonds across countries 
could be the result of a lack of variability amongst government bond indices. As Larrain et al. 
(1997) and Reisen (1999) note for emerging markets, governments bonds are not actively 
traded, being mostly held by long-term institutional investors or by central banks. Most of the 
indices used in the study are government bond indices. In addition, Christiansen’s (2007) 
study notes that in stable periods, close-to-close daily returns on international stock markets 






Table 7: Estimation results of regressions of stock and bond market volatilities with nine agencies Eq (5)   
 
Note: Table 5 reports the estimation results that correspond to the regression in Eq (5). Negative t-stats are reported in parenthesis. Control variables, X, in  Eq (5) include daily, monthly and annual dummies.  
*  Represents statistical significance at 10%. 
**  Represents statistical significance at 5%. 
***  Represents statistical significance at 1%.  
Events Stock Market Bond Market
Emerging Markets South America Europe Asia Emerging Markets South America Europe Asia
Upgrade t -0.0000000572 -0.0000006191 -0.0000011817 0.0000004896 0.0000458097 -0.0000024459 -0.0000420818 -0.0000080490
(0.012) (0.028) (0.206) 0.064 1.837 * (0.232) (0.768) (0.580)
t - 1 0.0000004171 -0.0000115598 -0.0000046995 0.0000122127 0.0000224241 -0.0000021229 -0.0000106730 -0.0000085028
0.093 (0.592) (0.810) 1.597 0.860 (0.201) (0.184) (0.613)
t - 2 -0.0000006565 0.0000021427 0.0000036949 0.0000010826 0.0000597757 * 0.0000020873 0.0000936305 -0.0000074544
(0.146) 0.098 0.636 0.141 2.295 0.198 1.625 (0.537)
Downgrade t 0.0000312641 *** 0.0000040397 0.0000044523 0.0000725093 *** 0.0001179469 *** 0.0000044588 0.0001672692 *** -0.0000020518
7.337 0.176 0.870 8.359 7.456 0.598 5.862 (0.066)
t - 1 0.0000047840 -0.0000139057 0.0000086640 * 0.0000043773 0.0000043144 0.0000095547 0.0001157396 *** 0.0000014714
1.122 (0.607) 1.694 0.503 0.272 1.283 4.046 0.047
t - 2 -0.0000044334 0.0000046270 -0.0000000325 -0.0000030445 -0.0000586186 *** 0.0000162681 ** 0.0000040184 0.0000018215
(1.040) 0.202 (0.006) (0.350) (3.675) 2.185 0.140 0.059
t -0.0000008237 0.0000092121 -0.0000021930 -0.0000021413 -0.0000031475 0.0000004596 0.0000085252 -0.0000005522
(1.026) 0.609 (1.375) (0.911) (0.443) 0.043 0.280 (0.063)
t - 1 -0.0000004976 0.0000041199 -0.0000022209 0.0000004558 0.0000020548 -0.0000058327 0.0000240155 -0.0000019642
(0.618) 0.272 (1.385) 0.194 0.288 (0.533) 0.772 (0.227)
t - 2 -0.0000002518 0.0000083228 -0.0000018314 0.0000019304 -0.0000056729 -0.0000070628 0.0000131721 -0.0000005506
(0.312) 0.551 (1.142) 0.822 (0.796) (0.670) 0.424 (0.063)
t 0.0000005672 0.0000140640 0.0000017401 0.0000068494 ** 0.0000027870 0.0000045872 0.0000026677 -0.0000027962
0.661 0.970 1.095 2.561 0.540 0.974 0.142 (0.156)
t - 1 0.0000036101 *** -0.0000046635 0.0000054833 *** 0.0000190104 *** -0.0000011010 -0.0000025407 -0.0000161845 -0.0000034091
4.213 (0.321) 3.456 7.104903475779356 (0.213) (0.539) (0.866) (0.191)
t - 2 0.0000007136 -0.0000124506 0.0000000512 -0.0000030883 -0.0000011760 -0.0000038317 -0.0000156601 -0.0000009436
0.832 (0.859) 0.032 (1.153) (0.228) (0.831) (0.844) (0.052)
0.9760530728 *** 0.9446536033 0.9747170752 *** 0.98569835 *** 0.6208511734 *** 0.764765835 *** 0.013825792 0.089331298 ***
1853.992 438.728 1024.863 1376.437 127.625 148.775 0.013 6.291
R^2 0.964 0.912 0.964 0.980 0.710 0.875 0.582 0.173
Observations 168060 9753 54573 54300 25093 4897 6740 4847
Countries 21 3 7 6 11 2 3 2
#Upgrades 117 13 47 32 66 14 26 11
#Downgrades 128 14 57 25 91 11 53 8
#Upgrades (Other) 4276 26 1068 472 964 40 160 40






In Table 7, amongst the stock exchanges, volatility spill-over was found for emerging 
markets as a whole, Europe and Asia, but not for South America and as such, provides 
evidence for continental contagion on a regional level. North America was excluded as it did 
not contain enough emerging markets and Africa was also excluded because there were  
insufficient highly functional stock and bond markets to run the panel regression. As before, 
nations that exhibited a near singular matrix or singular matrix errors were excluded.  
The results can be complemented by Li et al.’s (2007) findings of contagion effects of 
credit ratings amongst Asian stock returns. In addition, spill-over effects only resulted from 
downgrades, upgrades lead to no sign of contagious effects on stock volatility. This is 
expected as Table 4 provides no evidence that a country’s own ratings upgrade will affect its 
own stock exchange, yet alone the stock exchange of another nation. This is contrasted with 
Afonso et al. (2014), who finds both downgrades and upgrades to have significant volatility 
spill-over effects across EU nations stocks.  
Table 7 also reiterates that countries’ own downgrades do in fact, have a significant 
effect, while upgrades again are confirmed to have no effect when nine agencies are used. 
The direction of these contagion effects was that downgrades lead to an increase in stock 
volatility in non-event nations. Afonso et al. (2014) found that upgrades lead to a decrease in 
volatility while downgrades lead to an increase in volatility across nations. 
Downgrades are shown to have a significant effect on an own country’s bond 
volatility, for the emerging markets as a whole, and for South America and Europe. There is 
however no evidence of contagious effects on the volatility of bonds for emerging markets as 
a whole or for any of the continents. This is contrasted with Afonso et al. (2014) who found 
upgrades and downgrades to have significant volatility spill-over effects among EU nations. 
Contrary to previous results, upgrades are found to have a significant effect on an own 




5 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
In summation, the results of this study in Table 1 provide evidence that as the 
sovereign rating of a nation declines, the historical volatility inherent in the stock market 
clearly increased, but there is no visual pattern for bonds. On average of the emerging 
markets, speculative grade nations experience approximately 2.76 times more volatility in 
their stock markets and 4.93 times more in their bond markets than their investment grade 
counterparts. The results are in line with Heinke (2006) and Jaramillo and Tejada (2011). 
Table 2 shows that shocks in stock and bond return volatility exhibit persistence, and 
the asymmetric phenomenon where negative return shocks have more of an impact on future 
returns, than positive return shocks. As such, this adds to the findings of Nelson (1991) and 
Engle et al. (2012). 
Tables 3 and 4 provide concreate evidence that supports earlier literature such as 
Afonso et al. (2014) in that rating downgrades have a significant impact on stock volatility, 
while upgrades have no such statistically significant effect. It can be concluded that the 
asymmetric effect of rating downgrades perpetuates from returns to the second moments of 
stocks, and that downgrades lead to increased stock volatility and as such, greater market 
uncertainty. However, for bonds, Table 3 finds no evidence of an asymmetric effect while 
Table 4 does. Both tables of results however, do conclude that downgrades do affect bond 
volatility and may even increase bond volatility.  
Tables 6 and 7 provide evidence of contagion amongst emerging stock markets as a 
whole, and in addition, find contagion effects amongst the continents of Europe and Asia, but 
this effect is a result of downgrades in non-event nations with only a slight contagion effect 
from upgrades found in Table 6. These downgrade contagion effects lead to increased 
volatility of non-event nations. As for bonds, there is no evidence of contagion effects found 
amongst emerging markets as a whole, or any of the individual continents in Tables 6 and 7, 
thus conflicting with Afonso et al.’s (2014) result of significant volatility spill-over in the EU 
bond market. This is the most surprising result as bonds have been found to be reactive to 
contagion effects amongst other studies (Christiansen, 2007), but no evidence is present in 




The importance of the findings, as mentioned before, are three fold. It adds to the 
current theoretical knowledge of sovereign credit ratings, and their impact of emerging 
markets, as it provides new insight into the pricing of emerging market assets.  
Second, it provided valuable information to international investors and portfolio 
managers who wish to avoid unwanted risk. From this study, they can take the understanding 
that when it comes to stocks and bonds as financial instruments, downgrades are a significant 
risk factor to their bottom line, while upgrades are less worrisome. Arezki (2011) evidenced 
that during financial crises, stock markets are shown to react to rating changes in foreign 
countries more quickly than to rating changes in their own country. Thus, downgrades from 
neighbouring nations can significantly increase volatility inherent in non-event nation’s stock 
markets, and as such, investors can anticipate greater market uncertainty resulting from rating 
downgrades in neighbouring nations. This is especially true for emerging markets in Europe 
and Asia.  
Third, for policy makers a solid understanding of downgrades as a predictor of 
increased market uncertainty, will allow for proactive measures which can lessen the 
likelihood of a default or prolonged recession. Li et al. (2007) and Mora (2006) found no 
evidence of the pro-cyclicality of sovereign ratings amongst nations, while Kraussl (2005) 
found evidence of pro-cyclicality on a SMP index. This study however, reaches the same 
recommendation as Christopher et al. (2012) in that rating agencies need to monitor and 
revise ratings in a timely manner in order not to exacerbate pro-cyclical effects and avoid 
volatility spill-overs. 
Larrain (1997) and Reinsen (1999) emphasise the ability of policy makers to smooth the 
business cycle and dampening crises are part of this smoothing process.  Our study extends 
their recommendation, in that policy makers need to watch for possible volatility spill-overs 
from other emerging markets, especially in their regional vicinity. This needs to be 
interpreted with caution however, as the spill-over, while a signal for possible contagion, 
could have resulted from a shock in developed economies. Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) 
point to the common lender and international trade as possible transmission mechanisms. 
However, rating changes that cause volatility in other emerging markets, regardless of 
origination, are signals for possible contagion amongst emerging markets. 
Future research on the topic could go further in-depth by demonstrating what the basis 
point benefit to an individual investor would be, of factoring in rating downgrades from home 
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nations and also by factoring in contagion effects. This could be done using a portfolio 
optimising mean variance approach as demonstrated in Afonso et al. (2014). In addition to 
the possible financial gain, it can be demonstrated how sovereign rating information can 
assist investors in their calculation of VAR (Value at risk). The approach would be to 
compare the VAR of portfolios which factor in ratings information vs those that do not, in 
line with Afonso et al. (2014). Furthermore, this study could be replicated with actively 
traded bonds such as in Larrain et al. (1997) instead of government bond indices, as the 
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Data source for daily stock and bond data. Included country, index and Bloomberg code 
Brazil -  Ibovespa Brazil Sao Paulo Stock Exchange Index     IBOV Index  
  Brazil Government Generic Bond 10 Year index     GEBR10Y   
Bulgaria -  Bulgaria Stock Exchange Sofix Index      SOFIX Index 
  Generic Bulgaria 10 year bond index      GTBGN10Y 
China -  Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index      SHCOMP Index
  Generic china 10 year government bond index     GTCNY10Y 
Czech Republic - Prague Stock Exchange PX index      PX Index  
  Generic Czech 10 year Government bond index     GTCZK10Y 
Colombia - Bolsa de Valores de Colombia COLCAP Index     IGBC Index 
  Generic Colombia 10 year government bond index     GTCOP10Y 
Croatia -   Croatia Zagreb Stock Exchange Crobex Index     CRO Index 
  Generic Croatia 10 year Government Bond index GTHRK10Y 
Egypt -  Egyptian Exchange EGX30  EGX30 Index 
  Egyptian 10 year treasury bonds index  EGPT10Y  
Greece -   Athens Stock Exchange market Index FTSEA Index 
  Generic Greece 10 year government bond GTGRD10Y 
Hungary -  Budapest stock exchange Index BUX Index 
  Generic Hungary 10 year government bond       GTHUF10Y 
India -  NIFTY Index NIFTY 
  Generic India 10 year Government Bond GTINR10Y 
Indonesia - Jakarta stock exchange composite index JCI 
  Generic Indonesia 10 year government bond  GTIDR10Y 
Israel -  Tel Aviv 25 Index TA-25 
  Current Israel 10 year government bond CTILS10Y 
Jamaica -  Jamaica Stock Exchange Market index JMD 
  Current Jamaica USD 10 Year Government Bond GTUSDJM10Y 
Lithuania -  OMX Vilnius Index VILSE 
  Current Lithuania EUR 10 Year Government Bond CTEURLT10Y 
Malaysia -  FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Index (Kuala Lumpur composite Index) FBMKLCI 
  Current Malaysia 10 year Government Bond CTMYR10Y 
Mexico -  Mexican Bolsa IPC Index MEXBOL 
  Generic Mexico USD 10 Year Government bond                                                                                    GTUSDMX10Y 
Nigeria -  Nigerian Stock Exchange Main board index NGSEINDX 
  Generic Nigeria 10 year government bond GTNGN10Y 
Pakistan -  Karachi Stock Exchange KSE100 Index KSE100 
  Generic Pakistan 10 year Government Bond GTPKR10Y 
Panama -  Bolsa de Valores de Panama General Index BVPSBVPS 
  Generic Panama 10 year Government Bond GTPAB10Y 
Peru -  Bolsa de Valores de Lima General Sector Index IGBVL 
  Generic Peru 10 Year Government Bond  GTPEN10Y 
Philippines - Philippines stock exchange PSEi Index PCOMP 
  Generic Philippines 10 year government bond GTPHP10Y 
Poland -  Warsaw stock exchange WIG total return index WIG 
  Generic Poland 10 year Government Bond GTPLN10Y 
Romania -  Bucharest stock exchange trading index  BET 
  Generic Romania 10 year Government Bond GTRON10Y 
Russia -  Russian Trading system cash Index RTSI$ 
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  Generic Russia 10 year government bond  GTRUB10Y 
Slovakia -  Slovak Share Index SKSM 
  Generic Slovakia 10 year government Bond GTSKK10Y 
Slovenia -  Ljubljana stock exchange Slovenian Blue-Chip SBITOP Index SBITOP 
  Generic Slovenia 10 year government bond GTSIT10Y 
South Africa - FTSE/JSE Africa All Share Index JALSH 
  Generic South Africa 10 Year Government Bond GTZAR10Y 
Thailand -  Bangkok SET Index SET 
  Generic Thailand 10 Year Government Bond GTTHB10Y 
Turkey -  Borsa Istanbul 100 Index XU100 
  Generic Turkey 10 Year Government Bond  GTTRY10Y 
Ukraine -  Ukraine PFTS Index PFTS 
  Generic Ukraine 10 Year Government Bond GTUAH10Y 
Venezuela - Caracas Stock Exchange Stock Market Index IBVC 
  Generic Venezuela 10 Year Government Bond GTVEF10Y 
Countries included in Panel regressions 
Table 3 Stock Market: Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Jamaica, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,  Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela.  
Table 3 Bond Market: Brazil, Greece, Jamaica, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Slovenia, South Africa, Ukraine, Venezuela.  
Table 4 Stock Market: Colombia, Croatia, Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines,  Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela.  
Table 4 Bond Market: Bulgaria, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Nigeria, Panama, Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela.  
Table 5 Stock Market GJR GARCH: Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Croatia, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Jamaica, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, 
Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela.  
Table 5 Bond Market GJR GARCH: Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Croatia, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Jamaica, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, 
Ukraine, Venezuela.  
Table 6 Stock Market Emerging: Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Jamaica, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, Ukraine, Venezuela.   
Table 6 Stock Market South America: Colombia, Peru, Venezuela. 
Table 6 Stock Market Europe: Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia. 
Table 6 Stock Market Asia: India, Israel, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia. 
Table 6 Bond Market Emerging: Brazil, Greece, Jamaica, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Slovenia, South Africa, Ukraine, Venezuela. 
Table 6 Bond Market Europe: Greece, Poland, Ukraine. 
Table 6 Bond Market Asia: Pakistan, Philippines.  
Table 7 Stock Market Emerging: Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Jamaica, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Venezuela.   
Table 7 Stock Market South America: Colombia, Peru, Venezuela. 
Table 7 Stock Market Europe: Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia. 
Table 7 Stock Market Asia: India, Israel, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia. 
Table 7 Bond Market Emerging: Brazil, Colombia, Greece, Jamaica, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Slovenia, South Africa, Ukraine, 
Venezuela. 
Table 7 Bond Market South America: Brazil, Colombia. 
Table 7 Bond Market Europe: Greece, Poland, Ukraine. 




Table 8: Augmented Dickey Fuller test results 
 
Note: The values reported are P-vales for the ADF test. The test was conducted with 3 separate tests for each nation, with an intercept, with 
an intercept and a trend coefficient and with neither. The lags for the ADF test were set using the Schwarz Info Criterion. 
Country Intercept Trend and Intercept None Intercept Trend and Intercept None
Brazil 0 0 0 0.0001 0 0.0001
Bulgaria 0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0001 0 0.0001
China 0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0001 0 0.0001
Colombia 0.0001 0 0.0001 0 0 0
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0 0 0
Egypt 0 0 0.0001 0 0 0
Greece 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0 0 0
Hungary 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0 0.0001
India 0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Indonesia 0.0001 0 0.00001 0 0 0
Israel 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0 0 0
Jamaica 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0.0001 0 0 0
Malaysia 0 0 0 0.0001 0 0.0001
Mexico 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0 0.0001
Nigeria 0.0001 0 0.0001 0 0 0
Pakistan 0 0 0 0.0001 0 0.0001
Panama 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0 0 0.0001
Peru 0 0 0 0.0001 0 0.0001
Philippines 0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Poland 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Romania 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0 0 0
Russia 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0 0.0001
Slovakia 0 0 0 0.0001 0 0.0001
Slovenia 0.0001 0 0.0001 0 0 0
South Africa 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0 0.0001
Thailand 0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0001 0 0.0001
Turkey 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0 0 0
Ukraine 0.0001 0 0.0001 0 0 0.0001
Venezuela 0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0001 0 0.0001
Stock Return Bond Return
